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Automatic and Indefinite Commitment Following an Insanity Acquittal: Jones v. United
States' — The last. few years have seen the introduction of widespread changes in the
insanity defense in both federal and state jurisdictions. Many of these changes resulted
from the intense outburst of public criticism of the defense which came in the wake of
John Hinckley's insanity acquittal following his attempted assassination of President
Ronald Reagan.' In the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, for example, Con-
gress responded to public pressure by modifying the version of the defense used in
federal circuits to limit its use by criminal defendants. 3 Another statutory approach
enacted by nine states in response to public criticism of the defense has been the
enactment of "guilty but mentally ill" verdicts. 4 A jury or court may enter such a verdict
only when a defendant has put. his mental health in issue by raising the insanity defense.'
Following a "guilty but mentally ill" verdict, an offender is sentenced in precisely the same
fashion as are offenders who are simply found guilty.' As is the case with the federal
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, "guilty but mentally ill" statutes are widely
viewed as efforts to limit the number of mentally ill offenders who may successfully raise
the insanity defense.'
In addition to legislative modifications in t he insanity defense designed to limit the
scope of the defense, the United States Supreme Court recently handed down an opinion
affecting the rights of mentally ill offenders. I n Jones v. United Slates, the Court considered
whether the government. could constitutionally gram mentally ill individuals who are
civilly committed greater procedural protections at commitment proceedings than those
procedural protections afforded offenders acquitted by reason of insanity.' Specifically,
the Court considered whether an acquittal by reason of insanity alone constitutes a
constitutionally adequate basis on which to ground an involuntary and indefinite psychi-
atric commitment.' The Court found that it did.'" The Court further held that. the
requirements of due process are met when the government requires an individual
committed following a successful insanity defense to bear the burden of showing that he
has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous to obtain release from confinement."
In so holding, the Jones Court. rejected the petitioner's claim that he was entitled to
' 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
1 See United States v. Hinckley, 525 F. Stipp. 1342 (D.D.C.), op. clarified, reconsideration denied,
529 F. Supp. 520 (D.D.C.), aff'd 672 F.2d 115 (D.C. Cir. 1982). For a discussion (tithe public outrage
which followed Hinckley's acquittal, see Perr, The Hinckley Case, the Media, and the Insanity Defense, 28
j. Font. Sci. 816, 818-20 (1983); Rodriguez, LeWinn, and Perlin, The Insanity Defense Under Siege:
Legislative Assault and Legal Rejoinders, 14 RuTe.mis L.J. to 897, 904-19 (1983); Slovenko, The Insanity
Defense in the Wake of the Hinckley Trial, 14 RUTGERS L.J. 373, 373 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Sloven ko].
3 Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473 (Title 11), 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
4 Hermann, Assault on the Insanity Defense: Limitations on the Effectiveness and Effect of the Defense of
Insanity, 14 Ru•GERs L.j. 241, 360-69(1983) [hereinafter cited as Hermann]: Slovenko, supra note 2,
at 373, 392-95; Note, Guilty But Mentally III: A Critical Analysis. 14 RuTGERS L.f. at 453, 453-77 (1983)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Guilty But Mentally 1111.
' Hermann, supra note 4, at 360-61.
6 Id. at 362.
Id. at 362 -71; Slovenko,.mpra note 2, at 393-95; Note, Guilty But Menially Ill, supra note 4, at
465-77.
463 U.S. 354, 371 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9 Id.
'" Id. at 370.
o
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recommitment in proceedings where the government has the burden of proving mental
illness and dangerousness."
In Jones, the petitioner had been automatically committed following his insanity
acquittal under District of Columbia Code section 24-301." This statute provides that in
order to be acquitted by reason of insanity, a criminal defendant must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that. the criminal act with which he is charged was
committed because of mental illness." A person acquitted under this statute is automat-
ically committed to a mental institution for an indefinite period of time,' 5
 Fifty days
following commitment, and every six months thereafter, the committed individual ("in-
sanity acquittee") is entitled to a judicial hearing to determine whether he is still mentally
ill or dangerous. 16
 The statute also provides that, to obtain a release from confinement,
the insanity acquittee must prove by a preponderance of the evidence" that he is no
longer mentally ill or dangerous.'"
Jones was arrested in September 1975 on a charge of attempted petit larceny for
trying to steal a jacket from a department store.'" On the following day, he was arraigned
and committed to a mental institution for psychiatric evaluation of his competency to
stand trial. 2" Five and a half months later, a hospital psychiatrist submitted a report to the
superior court, stating that although Jones was competent to stand trial, he was schizo-
phrenic, and that his mental illness had produced his allegedly criminal behavior,' The
superior court determined that Jones was competent. to stand trial, and Jones entered a
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity."
On March 12, 1976, a few days after the submission of the psychiatrist's report, the
District of Columbia Superior Court acquitted Jones of attempted petit larceny by reason
12 Id .
13
 Id.
" D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(j) (1981) provides:
insanity shall not he a defense in any criminal proceeding in the United States
District. Court for the District of' Columbia or in the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia, unless the accused or his attorney in such proceeding, at the time the
accused enters his plea of not guilty or within 15 clays thereafter or at such later time as
the court may for good cause permit, files with the court and serves upon the prosecut-
ing attorney written notice of his intention to rely on such defense. No person accused
of an offense shall he acquitted on the ground that he was insane at the time of its
commission unless his insanity, regardless of who raises the issue, is affirmatively
established by a preponderance, of the evidence.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(1) (1981)
provides:
If any person tried upon an indictment or information for an offense raises the
defense of insanity and is acquitted solely on the ground that he was insane at the time
of its commission, he shall be committed to a hospital for the mentally ill until such time
as he is eligible for release pursuant to this subsection or subsection (e) of this section.
" D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-301(d)(2), 24.301(k) (1981).
" D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(2)(B) (1981).
" D.C. CODE ANN. § 21-545(b) (1981). The insanity acquittee is also entitled to release on court
approval of certification of recovery by the mental institution chief of service. D.C. CODE: ANN. §
24-301(e) (1981).
'Jones, 463 U.S. at 359.
26 Id. Although the Jones Court cites to the 1981 District of Columbia Code, the petitioner in
Jone.s was committed under the 1973 District of Columbia Code. The statutory content in relevant
sections is substantially the same in hods versions,
21 463 U.S. at 359-60.
22 Id. at 360.
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of insanity." He was committed to St. Elizabeth's Hospital under District of Columbia
Code section 24-301(4 .24 This provision states that a person may he acquitted of a crime
by reason of insanity" if the individual's insanity is "affirmatively established by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence." 26
 Following commitment, t he insanity acquittee is emit led to
a judicial hearing within fifty days of confinement, and every six mom hs thereafier,' to
determine whet her he has regained his sanity or is no longer dangerous." The insanity
acquit I ee is also entitled to release upon court approval of a certification of recovery by
the confining institution's chief of service."
Jones' fifty-day release hearing was held on May 25, 1976 in the District. of Columbia
Superior Couri. 3" The court found that Jones remained mentally ill and dangerous, and
he was returned to St.. Elizabeth's Hospital.' On February 22, 1977, more than a year
after Jones was first committed, a second release hearing was held. 32 At this hearing, Jones
argued that he was entitled to immediate release because he had been confined for a
period of lime which exceeded the maximum possible prison sentence of one year for the
crime of attempted petit larceny." Alternatively, the petitioner argued that, if not entitled
to immediate release, he was entitled to recommitment under procedures similar to the
procedures used in civil commitments.' Those procedures included the right to a jury
23 Id.
'24 Id. See supra note 15 for the language of D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(d)(1) (1981).
'" D.C. Coos: ANN". § 24-301(j) (1981). The rule in the District of Columbia for finding that a
person committed a crime because he was mentally ill was enunciated by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals in United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). The Browner court
adopted the American Law 111Slitute MODEL. PENAL CODE § 4.01, which provides that a "person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect
he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law."
°' Generally, three standards of proof have been developed for use in determining whether or
not a defendant is guilty of a crime, liable fur an act, or may be excused from liability, as in
commitment proceedings. The "preponderance of the evidence" standard is applied in civil suits. See
Simon and Mahan, Quantifying Burdens of Proof, 5 L. & Soc. REv. 319 passim (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Burdens of Proof). It is the least burdensome standard for the moving party to meet, in part because
society is minimally concerned with the outcome of private civil disputes. See Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979). The "clear and convincing evidence" standard is an intermediate one, less
burdensome to the moving party than the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. Id. at 424. The
"clear and convincing" standard applies when the risk of an erroneous outcome carries with it the
potential for greater harm to the individual than in suits applying a ''preponderance" standard. Id.
Thus, the risk of an erroneous deprivation is lowered by increasing the plaintiff's burden of proof.
Id. The "clear and convincing" standard is also used to "protect particularly important individual
interests in various civil cases.Thi. Finally, in criminal trials, evidence that a person committed a crime
must be proved "beyond a reasonable doubt" in order for the accused to be convicted. See Burdens of
Proof, supra, at 319. This standard reflects society's desire to rule out the risk of an erroneous
deprivation by placing that risk almost entirely on itself. See Addington, 441 U.S. at 423-24.
" D.C. Cane ANN. §§ 24-301(d)(2), 24-301(k)(5) (1981).
w D.C. Com,. ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981). The Jones Court determined that, under District of
Columbia Code provisions, both civil committees and insanity acquittees, to obtain release from
confinement, must show that they are no longer mentally ill or dangerous to themselves Or others,
463 U.S. at. 358 n.3.
29 D.C. CODE: ANN. § 24-301(e) (1981).
30 463 U.S. at 360.
31 Id .
33 Id.
34 Id. D.C. CODE ANN. § '21-545 regulates civil commitment proceedings in the District of
782	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 26:779
trial on the issue of continuing insanity, with the government bearing the burden of
proving insanity by clear and convincing evidence.a'' The superior court held that Jones
was not entitled either to immediate release or to recommit ment under civil commitment
proceed ings, 3"
Jones appealed this ruling to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. A panel of
Columbia. Under this section, a civil committee has the right to a jury. D.C. Cone ANN. § 21-545(b)
(1981). In addition, the government bears the burden of proving insanity at the commitment hearing
by "clear and convincing evidence." See infra note 35. At the time Jones' case was before the Superior
Court, the government had to prove insanity and dangerousness by a "preponderance of the
evidence" in civil commitment proceedings in the District of Columbia. Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d
642, 651 (D.C. Cir. 1966). This standard has since been changed by the Court's decision in Ad-
dington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). See infra notes 111-26 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Addington (standard of proof in civil commitment cases must be proof of mental illness and
dangerousness by "clear and convincing evidence").
Case law in the District of Columbia supports the petitioner's argument in Jones that he was
entitled either to immediate release upon. the expiration of the maximum possible prison sentence
for his crime or to recommitment under procedures similar to those used in civil commitment
proceedings. The petitioner relied on these cases to support his constitutional claims. See Brief for
Petitioner at 28; Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983). For example, in Waite v. Jacobs, 475
F,2d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1973), the appellant was acquitted by reason of insanity of assault with a
dangerous weapon and was committed to a mental institution. Id. at 393, The appellant contended
that, after expiration of a period equal to the duration of the maximum possible prison sentence he
could have received had he been convicted, the burden should shift to t he government to prove that
be continued to be mentally ill and dangerous and therefore that his confinement should continue.
Id. at 394-95. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals remanded the appellant's case, holding that
on remand the lower court should consider the appellant's claim, Id. at 400-01. No printed record
exists of the disposition of appellant's case on remand. In reaching its conclusion that the appellant
had raised a colorable claim, the Court of Appeals reasoned that after the expiration of the period an
insanity acquittee could have been incarcerated had he been convicted some question existed
whether, under the equal protection clause, it was irrational to distinguish between insanity acquit-
tees and civil committees when allocating the burden of proving continuing mental illness and
dangerousness. Id. at 395.
Similar criticism of the District of Columbia's commitment scheme is found in United States v.
Brown, 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In Brown, the appellant was acquitted by reason of insanity of
several crimes, including robbery, assault and rape. Id. at 607. The United States Court of' Appeals
for the District of Columbia held that the "preponderance of t he evidence" rather than the "reason-
able doubt" standard should be used when determining whether someone found not guilty by reason
of insanity is mentally ill and should he committed to a mental institution. Id. at 612. In reaching this
conclusion, the Brown court questioned the constitutionality of the District's commitment scheme
under which the appellant had been committed. Id. The court stated that, when a committed person
has been detained for a "considerable period," continued detention should be governed by the
standard of proof used in civil commitments. Id. The court further stated that, alt hough the length of
each commitment is discretionary, several factors should be taken into account when determining the
appropriate commitment duration. Id. These factors included whether a crime was violent or not, the
nature of the treatment, and the committed person's response to treatment. Id. The court concluded
that confinements generally would not exceed five years and never should exceed the maximum
sentence for the offense, minus mandatory release time. N.
3' See D.C. ConE. ANN- § 21-545(b) (1981). Civil commitment procedures differ from procedures
available when an insanity acquittee challenges continuing commitment. Under D.C. CODE ANN. §
24-301W, a committed insanity acquittee bears the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the
evidence that he has recovered his sanity. Under D.C. Conti ANN, § 21-545(6), which regulates civil
commitment proceedings, an individual whom the government seeks to commit may have a jury, and
the government bears the burden of proving insanity by "clear and convincing evidence," See supra
note 34.
36
 Jones, 463 U.S. at 360-61.
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the court initially affirmed the lower court decision, 37 but then reversed on rehearing.'
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals heard the case en bane and affirmed t he superior court's
ruling.'" The court held that Jones' due process anti equal protection rights were not
violated by continuing commitment." In reaching its holding, the court of appeals
addressed Jones' argument that the District of Columbia's criminal commit ment scheme
was partly punitive in nature. 4 ' In the District of Columbia, Congress has determined that
an insanity acquittal raises presumptions of continuing mental illness and dangerousness
sufficiently strong to ground an automatic comtnitn ► ent. 4 ' Jones argued t hat an insanity
acquittal alone was constitutionally insufficient to ground presumptions of continuing
dangerousness and mental illness in every case. 43 He also argued that., because automatic
commitment could not be just ified by evidence of dangerousness in every case, to pre-
sume dangerousness, when in fact none existed, was impermissibly punitive." Finally,
Jones argued that, because it was based on a punitive rationale, his continuing confine-
ment was unconstit utionai. 45 The court of appeals rejected Jones' constitutional claims.'
The court. concluded that Jones' commit ment. was based on legitimate and nonpunit ive
grounds, including the government's strong interest in protecting the public and re-
habilitating mental patients:17 Additionally, the court found that t he duration of a com-
mitment was solely a function of the length of time necessary for a patient either to
recover his sanity or to stop being dangerous to himself or to others." Consequently, the
court concluded that Jones' claim that he either be released or civilly committed was
wit.hout merit."
37 Jones v. United States, 396 A.2d 183 (D.C. 1978).
33 Jones v. United States, 41 I A,2d 624 (D.C. 1980). This reversal was based on an interpretation
of the District of Columbia's commitment-release procedures for insanity acquittees as partly puni-
tive in nature. Id. at 630. The Cowl of Appeals panel held that, because of the partly punitive
. character of the District of Columbia's commitment-release procedures For insanity acquittees, as a
matter of equal protection, committed insanity acquit tees must either he released or civilly committed
following the expiration of the maximum possible prison sentence they could have received had t hey
been convicted. Id. See D.C. Cott: ANN. § 24 - 301(d) (1981). In concluding that the District of
Columbia criminal commitment statute was partly punitive in nature, the Court of Appeals panel
rejected the government's argument that an acquittal by reason of insanity raises a presumption of
continuing mental illness sufficient to ground its automatic commitment of insanity acquitteesjones,
411 A.2d at 630. On the basis of its rejection of this argument, the court held that differences
between the District of Columbia's criminal and civil commit meat procedures "cannot be justified on
purely evidentiary grounds," and t hat the criminal commitment-release procedure was partly puni-
tive in nature. Id. The panel concluded that the petitioner should be immediately released or civilly
committed because the maximum prison sentence of one year he could have received if convicted
had expired. Id.
39 Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364, 376 (D.C. 1981).
11 Id. at 371-76.
41 1(1. at 371.
42 See D.C. CODE ANN, § 24-301(d)(1) (1981). See also Jones, 103 S. Ct. at 3048-50 (citing H.R. REP.
No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1970)).
43 Jones, 432 A.2d at 370-74.
" Id.
" Id.
" Id. at 368.
" Id. at 371.
" Id. at 369-70.
" Id. at 370.
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The court of appeals also considered Jones' equal protection argument that the
government should bear the burden of proving continued insanity by clear and convinc-
ing evidence after the expiration of the maximum possible prison sentence which he
could have received had he been convicted of attempted petit larceny," According to the
court, the differences between civil and criminal commitment procedures, which include
different standards of proof and the unavailability of a jury at the criminal commitment
release hearing, were rationally related to situational differences between civil and crimi-
nal commitments." On this ground the court held that the government had no duty to
prove continuing insanity:"
After granting certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the decision of
the court of appeals, and held that the government could constitutionally continue the
petitioner's indefinite comminnent.' 3
 The Court rejected the petitioner's arguments that
he was constitutionally entitled loan immediate release from psychiatric hospitalization or
to recommitment under proceedings in which the government has the burden of proving
mental illness or dangerousness:" In upholding the validity of the District of Columbia's
commitment-release procedures, the Court concluded that the government could con-
stitutionally commit a criminal defendant following an acquittal by reason of insanity
automatically for .an indefinite period of
This casenote will examine the Jones Court's ruling on the constitutionality of the
challenged release provisions of the District of Columbia's criminal commitment statute.
To demonstrate how Jones departs from the clear trend established by the Court. in prior
commitment cases increasing procedural protections for mentally ill offenders, the case-
note will first review Supreme Court. cases which have addressed the question of what
procedural protections are constitutionally required when mentally ill offenders are
committed. The casenote will then review the majority opinion and Justice Brennan's
dissent ing opinion, Finally, the Court's opinion inJones will be analyzed. The casenote will
conclude that. Jones was incorrectly decided for three principal reasons. First, the Jones
Court accorded little weight to relevant case law in the commitment area. Although no
prior Supreme Court case is directly on point, the casenote will demonstrate that the
holdings in earlier Supreme Court cases in this area support. Jones' argument that
continued commitment violates his constitutional rights under the due process clause.
Second, due process requires that a constitutional commitment be based on findings of
mental illness and dangerousness. It will be submitted that, because the petitioner's
5'} Id. at 371. See itifra notes 135 and 247 'Or a discussion of the Supreme Court's treatment of
the petitioner's equal protection claims.
Jones, 432 A.2d at 374-75. Included among these differences is that an insanity acquince,
unlike a civil committee, affirmatively raises die issue of mental illness. Id. at 375. in addition,
because insanity acquittees raise and prove at trial that they were insane when they committed their
crimes, the court concluded that Congress could constitutionally require committed acquittees to
bear the burden of proving recovered sanity at subsequent release hearings. Id. Contrasting civil
committees from committed insanity acquittees, the court stated that when the government seeks to
commit a person civilly who disputes the government's position that he is both insane and dangerous.
in contrast to the situation which exists when defendants themselves raise the issue of insanity at their
criminal trials, it. is "reasonable - that the government rather than the civil commitment candidate
bear the heavier burden of proof. Id.
52
53
 463 U.S. at 370.
" Id.
55 Id.
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commitment in Jones was based simply on presumptions and not on findings of both
mental illness and dangerousness, his continued commitment. is a violation of due process.
Third, due process requires that a reviewing court. carefully weigh each important
interest in a case before reaching its holding. It will he submitted that the Jones Court
failed to give the petitioner a constitutionally adequate review of his claims by failing to
balance all important interests involved in this case prior to reaching its conclusion that
the petitioner was not entitled to release or recommitment under procedures similar to
civil commitment. proceedings. For these reasons, the article will conclude that t he Court's
decision in Jones marks an unwarranted retreat from the previously unbroken Supreme
Court trend toward strengthened procedural protections for mentally ill offenders.
I. THE TREND TOWARD STRENGTHENED PROCEDURAL. PROTECTIONS FOR MENTALLY I L.t.
OFFENDERS: SUPREME COURT CASE LAW PRIOR TO JONES V. UNITED STATES
No Supreme Court case directly addresses the question of what procedural protec-
tions are required following a successful insanity defense!'" A number of Supreme Court
cases, however, have addressed various problems relating to the confinement of mentally
ill individuals and the concomitant curtailment of their liberty. For example, in Baxstrom v.
Herold, the Court reviewed a constitutional challenge to the automatic civil commitment of
a prisoner who had served a sentence for assault."' In Baxstrom, the petitioner challenged
he New York Department of Corrections request. that he he civilly committed under
special procedures used only when the state sought to commit a prisoner nearing the end
of' his prison sentence.'" The Supreme Court held that the petitioner could not. he
committed to a mental institution under these circumstances, but that he was entitled to
the same procedural protections afforded all other civil commitment candidates." 9 Be-
cause he was not given t he right to a jury review of the determination of his insanity, and
because he was denied a judicial determination that he was dangerously insane, the Court
concluded that the petitioner was denied equal protection."" In reaching the conclusion
that the petitioner was entitled to a jury review of the determination that he was insane,
t he Baxstrom Court reasoned that, because all other candidates for civil commitment were
given these procedural safeguards, no conceivable basis existed for distinguishing be-
tween a commitment candidate nearing the end of his prison sentence and other civil
commitment candidates."' In Baxstrom, therefore, the Court found that the presence of
criminality along wit It mental illness was not, without. more, ;t constitutionally adequate
ground on which to distinguish between differently situated civil commitment. candi-
d at es."2
The Supreme Court has also held that constitutionally sufficient procedural protec-
tions must he provided where convicted criminals may be subject to commitment in lieu of
sentencing because of t he nature of their crimes." In Specht v. Patterson, the Supreme
5" See id.
*7 Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (Black, J., concurring),
5' Id. at 108.
" Id, at 110-11.
'" Id. at 110.
'" Id. at 111-13.
" Id. at. 111 - 12; see Jones, 463 U.S. at 380 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (mental illness plus criminal
behavior constitutionally insufficient grounds for indefinite psychiatric commitment).
1'1 Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S 605 (f967) (Harlan, j., concurring in result).
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Court. considered the constitutional validity of state commitment procedures basing
indefinite confinement on a determination that an individual was an habitual offender
and mentally ill or dangerous to the public."' The Specht Court held that the pet itioner
had been denied due process by the procedures under which he was committed to a
treatment facility for sexual offenders."' In Specht, the petitioner was convicted for taking
"indecent liberties" under a statute specifying a maximum possible sentence of ten years."
On the basis of his conviction, the petitioner was sentenced in a separate proceeding
under a statute which called for detention for an indefinite period of time from one day to
life."' The Court held that the petitioner was denied due process because his conviction
based an entirely separate sentencing proceeding where new findings of fact had been
made on the question whether he was an habitual offender and mentally ill or danger-
. taus.`'" The Court further held that the sentencing proceeding, where it was determined
whether the petitioner was an habitual offender and mentally ill or dangerous, must
afford the petitioner stronger procedural protections because de novo fact finding was
involved. 69 In listing the procedural protections that were constitutionally necessary
during the second sentencing proceeding, the Specht Court concluded that due process
required that the petitioner have counsel, an opportunity to be heard and to confront
witnesses against him, i he right to cross-examine, and the right to present evidence.'"
Concluding that there must he findings adequate to make meaningful any appeals
allowed, the Court found that none of the constitutionally mandated procedural protec-
tions were present in the proceedings in question. 7 '
The Specht decision highlights the Court's concern in decisions prior to Jones that
persons committed under proceedings involving new findings of fact on the issues of
mental illness and dangerousness receive the same or similar procedural protections
given other similarly situated commitment. candidates. In Specht, the Court. determined
that such persons should not he denied constitutionally guaranteed procedural rights
simply because, in addition to being mentally ill, they have committed criminal acts.
The Supreme Court again heard a constitutional challenge to an indefinite commit-
ment in Humphrey v. Cody.' The petitioner in Humphrey was convicted in Wisconsin of
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a crime punishable by a maximum prison
sentence of one year." Under the statute challenged in this case, a person convicted of a
sexually-motivated crime was referred to the Department of Public Welfare for evalua-
tion." If the Department recommended treatment. for mental or physical abnormalities, a
hearing was held at which the state presented evidence on the individual's need for
treatment." The individual would be committed to the Department by the court., rather
" Id. at 606-08.
"' Id.
66 Id. at 607. See C01.0. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-32 (1963).
"7
	 386 U.S. at 607 -08. See Cow. Rev. STA-r, ANN. § 39-19-1 -10 (1963).
1"' Specht, 386 U.S. at 607-09.
" Id. at 608-11.
76 Id.
71 Id. at 610-11.
72 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
7' The petitioner was convicted under Wrs. STAT. ANN. § 947.15 (1958).
74 Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 507; see Wis. STAT. ANN. § 959.15 (1958). Under this statute, t he
individual was initially committed for treatment for a period oval to the maximum possible sentence
for that crime. At the end of that period, however, the COI -11111h num; could be renewed for periods of
up to five years.
" Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 507.
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than sentenced, if' the need for treatment. was proved.'" The commitment to the Depart-
ment was of the same duration as the maximum possible sentence for the crime." At the
end of the commitment period, the individual could he recommitted for additional
five-year periods if the reviewing court found that he would be a public danger clue to
some mental or physical abnormality."'
In Humphrey, the petitioner was committed under the Wisconsin Sex Crimes Act for
one year, and subsequently recommitted under a court order for five years.'" The
petitioner challenged his recommitment, arguing that he was entitled to the same pro-
cedural protections as civil commitment candidates." Under the Wisconsin civil commit-
ment statute which the petitioner cited, a commitment candidate had the right to a jury
determination on the question whether he met. the standards for commitment."t The
petitioner argued that his recommitment for a five-year period, made without. a jury,
denied him equal protection because he was not given the same procedural protections as
individuals hospitalized under the civil commitment statute."' Noting that the
commitment-renewal proceedings closely resembled the post-sentence commitment pro-
cedure challenged in Baxstrom, the Humphrey Court rejected the lower court's conclusion
that the petitioner's constitutional claims were too frivolous to require an evidentiary
hearing and remanded the case." By holding that the petitioner in Humphrey had a
colorable claim that his constitutional rights had been violated under the challenged
proceeding, the Court reinforced its position.t hat individuals committed under proceed-
ings involving new findings of' fact are constitutionally entitled to the same procedural
protections afforded to similarly situated civil commitment candidates.
In Jackson v. Indiana, the Supreme Court again considered the question of what
procedural protections are guaranteed under the Constitution to individuals indefinitely
committed."' -Hie petitioner in Jackson was a mentally defective deaf-mute charged with
robbery. 85
 Under Indiana law," the petitioner was given a non-jury hearing during which
he was represented by counsel to determine his competency to stand trial."' Following t his
hearing, the petitioner was committed to the Indiana Department of Mental Health until
such time as it certified him "sane."" Ruling on the petitioner's challenge to his commit-
ment, the Supreme Court noted that due to Jackson's deafness, mental deficiency, and
extremely poor communication skills it was unlikely that he would ever be found compe-
tent to stand trial." The Court concluded that the petitioner's commitment was, for all
practical purposes, permanent., and held that Indiana could not constitutionally commit
him for an indefinite length of time simply because he was incompetent. to stand trial."
"
"
78 Id.
79 Id .
"
gi Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.03 (1957).
62
 Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 508.
83 Id. at 517. No published record of the disposition of the petitioner's case on remand exists.
84 Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
" Id. at 717.
86 IND. ANN. STAT. § 9-1706a (Supp. 1971), subsequently kn. Con+. § 35-5-3-2 (1971).
8' Jackson, 406 U.S. at 718.
88 id, at 719.
m Id. at 725 - 26.
" Id. at 730.
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In Jackson, the Court held that the petitioner's equal protection and due process
rights had been violated. First., the Court. held that the petitioner's rights under the equal
protection clause were violated because he was not. given access to procedural safeguards
afforded persons civilly committed because of mental illness or feeble-mindedness."
Second, the Court. held that. the petitioner's rights under the due process clause had been
violated." Observing that, at a minimum, due process requires that both the nature and
duration of commitment must bear some "reasonable relation" to the purpose for which
the individual is committed, the Court concluded that it would violate due process to
commit a person charged with a crime for a period longer than the amount of time
necessary to determine whet her he would become competent to stand trial in the foresee-
able future."
In Baxstrom, Specht, Humphrey, and Jackson the Supreme Court concluded that the
commitment procedures in question were unconstitutional because they failed to provide
adequate procedural protections to the petitioners. In each of these cases, the Court held
that where the challenged commitment proceedings involved new findings of fact, indi-
viduals commit ted under those procedures were entitled to the same procedural protec-
tions as other individuals hospitalized under the state's ordinary civil commitment statute.
Furthermore, these cases firmly established a general trend in Supreme Court cases
increasing procedural protections for mentally ill offenders.
In the commitment area, the Supreme Court has also considered questions concern-
ing the required factual basis for a constitutional commit ment," the scope of t he interest
balancing a reviewing court must perform when considering a mentally ill individual's
constitutional challenge to state action , 95
 and the standard and burden of proof a party
must meet in civil commitment proceedings.°f'
In O'Connor v. Donaldson, the Supreme Court considered the first of these questions
and held that only when an individual is found to be both dangerous and menially ill can
he be constitutionally commined. 97
 The respondent in that case was committed to a
mental institution for fifteen years for care, maintenance, anti treatment following his
father's claim that he was delusional." The respondent brought an action against the
n Id. at 729-30.
92 Id. at 731.
93 Id. at 738. A similar Supreme Court case involved a minor convicted of two assaults and
sentenced to five years in prison. McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 (1972).
Instead of serving his sentence, McNeil was sent to a state mental health facility for an evaluation to
determine whether he should be committed for treatment. Id. at 246. McNeil refused to cooperate
with the mental health professionals there and was detained for evaluation beyond the time he could
have been incarcerated. Id. The McNeil Court concluded that the same due process considerations
circumscribing the petitioner's possible indefinite detention in Jackson v. Indiana. on the ground that
he was incompetent to stand trial controlled McNeil's indefinite commitment for observation and
evaluation. Id. at 249. Relying on Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967), and Humphrey v. Cady,
405 U.S. 504 (1972), the McNeil Court held that, because the petitioner had been held without a
hearing or an opportunity to he heard, he had been denied due process and should he immediately
discharged.
" O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975). Sec infra notes 97 - 103 and accompanying text
for a discussion of O'Connor.
95
 Mathews v. Eldridge. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See infra notes 105 - 10 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Mathew.% .
Addington V. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). See infra notes 111-26 and accompanying text for a
discussion of Addington.
97 O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575-76 (1975).
m Id. at 565-66.
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institution's director and other staff members, claiming that they had intentionally de-
prived hint of his constitutionally based right to liberty." He claimed that the director and
staff members could have released him at any time because they had authority to release
mentally ill patients who were not dangerous.m Concluding t hat t here is no constitutional
basis for involuntarily confining nondangerous, mentally ill persons if t hey can live safely
in freedom, the Court held that a person must be both dangerous and mentally ill before
a state can constitutionally commit him." Although the case was remanded on other
grounds," the O'Connor Court concluded that the petitioner, as a nondangerous person
capable of living safely outside a mental institution, was constitutionally entitled to his
freedom."'
Along with the requirement that a constitutional commit ment he based on findings of
both mental illness and dangerousness, due process requires that the government give
individuals adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard.'" In addition, due process
requires that a court considering a challenge to state action carefully balance each
important interest involved in a case when reaching its conclusion on the constitutionality
of the state action.'" 5
 The Supreme Court recently enunciated the principle elements
required in a constitutionally adequate due process analysis it) Mathews v. Eldridge.'" Itt .
that case, the Court specified that a court reviewing a challenge to governmental action
must balance three factors to insure that the challenged government action meets the
requirements of due process. First., a court must examine the private interest affected by
governmental action.'" Second, a court must. consider the government's interest in t he
function involved,'" including consideration of the fiscal and administrative costs that
99 Id. at 565.
Id. at 567. At trial, the mental institution's director was unable to provide reasons why he had
concluded that the respondent wou ld have been tillable to adjust to life outside the institution. M. at
567-68.
"' Id. at 575-76.
' "2 Id. at 577.
113 Id. at 576.
144 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 608-11
(1967); See also L. TRIBE, AMERICAN  CONSTITUTIONA L. LAIN 512-14 (1978) [hereinafter cited as L.
TRIBE]: see generally Note, Rules for an Exceptional Class: The Commitment and Release of Persons Acquitted
of Violent Offenses by Reason of Insanity, 57 N.V.U. L. REV. 281 (1982).
155 See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67,
80-96 (1972) (states' prejudgment replevin statutes unconstitutional under due process clause be-
cause no hearing permitted plaintiffs prior to states' seizure of property); Cafeteria & Restaurant
Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894 -99 (1961) (summary exclusion of worker from
naval facility without hearing or notification of cause held not to violate due process clause).
424 U.S. 319, 334 - 35 (1976). Mathews involved a constitutional challenge made by a person
whose social security disability benefits had been cut off. Id. at 324. The petitioner questioned the
constitutional validity of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare ("HEW') procedures
used in establishing whether or not a social security recipient had a continuing disability. Id. at
324-25. The Supreme Court held that the procedures used by H EW were constitutional under the
due process clause, and that no evidentiary hearing was necessary prior to terminating disability
benefits. Id. at 399.
'"T Id. at 335. In the commitment context, the private interest involved includes loss of liberty as
well as stigma associated with involuntary confinementiones, 463 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing),
w Mathews,. 424 U.S. at 335. In tfte commitment context, this consideration involves the
government's interest in protecting society from dangerously mentally ill individuals. Jones, 463 U.S.
at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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additional or more complex procedures would require.' 19 The final step in the analysis
requires a court to weigh the risk of error involved in using the challenged procedure
against the value of strengthened procedural safeguards.'
The Supreme Court recently applied the Mathews due process balancing test in
Addington v. Texas in determining which standard of proof is constitutionally required in
civil commitment proceedings."' In addition, the Addington Court considered whether
the government or the commitment candidate should hear the burden of proving or
disproving insanity at commitment proceedings. ' 5 After weighing the state's interests in
accurate and efficient commitment proceedings against the petitioner's interests in avoid-
ing commitment, the Addington Court concluded that a civil commitment candidate's
interest in liberty and autonomy outweigh the government's interests in isolating, protect-
ing and treating mentally ill persons.'''To confine a civil commitment candidate constitu-
tionally, the Addington Court. held that the government must bear the burden of proving
insanity by the standard of "clear and convincing evidence."'"
The petitioner in Addington had a history of emotional and mental problems prior to
the challenged commitment." 5 He was arrested in 1975 and charged with "assault by
threat" against his mother. ""
 His mother subsequently filed a petition for the petitioner's
indefinite commitment.'" Following a jury trial to establish whether he was menially ill
and dangerous under the standard of "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence,"
Addington was committed indefinitely. "" He appealed the cormnit mem, contending that
due process required that he be found mentally ill and dangerous tinder the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard used in criminal proceedings." 9
In reaching its holding that proof of insanity by the standard of "clear and convinc-
ing" evidence was constitutionally adequate under the due process clause, the Addington
Court used the Mathews clue process balancing test.'" Thus, the Court balanced the
petitioner's liberty interest against the state's interest in treating mentally ill and danger-
ous persons and in protecting these persons and the public from a menially ill individual's
dangerous behavior."' Observing that an individual should not be asked to share equally
with society the risk of an error when the possible injury to the individual is significantly
greater than possible harm to the state, 12 the Court held that., in light of the individual's
strong liberty interest., proof of menial illness by the standard of "clear and convincing
evidence" rather than that of "preponderance of the evidence" was necessary to insure
due process.'" In reaching this conclusion, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument
"9 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
H" Id. In the commitment context, this factor includes the ease or difficulty of proving or
disproving mental illness and dangerousness in court. Jones, 463 U.S. at 372 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" 1
 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-27 (1979).
112 Id. at 427.
113 Id.
Id. at 427, 433.
Id. at 420 -21.
16 Id, at 420.
"7 Id.
'" Id. at 421.
"" Id. at 421-22.
"" Id. at 425-27; ,see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334-35. See also Easterbrook, Substance and Due Process,
1982 Sup. Cr. Kr.v. 85, 88-89, 109.25, for an analysis of the Mathews due process balancing test.
"' Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-27.
132 Id. at 427.
in Id.
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that the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard was constitutionally mandated in civil
commitment proceedings.'" In its analysis, the Addington Court focused on the impor-
tance of the standard of proof, observing that a particular standard of proof alert s the fact
finder to the degree of confidence society believes it should have in the correctness of
factual conclusions For particular kinds of adjudication.' 25 The Court also noted that the
standard of proof allocates the risk of an erroneous finding, alerts the fact finder to the
relative importance of the final outcome, and in cases involving a deprivation of liberty,
indicates the relative importance which society places on those interests.' 2"
The decision in Addington continued the Court's trend toward increased procedural
safeguards for mentally ill individuals. Although the Addington Court rejected the
petitioner's argument that the standard of proof at his commitment proceedings should
be "beyond a reasonable doubt" in favor of the "clear and convincing evidence" standard,
the decision nevertheless established the Court's position that mentally ill individuals'
interests in liberty and autonomy must he very carefully weighed against the states'
interests in committing them.
In summary, past. Supreme Court decisions in cases raising constitutional challenges
to commitment proceedings have established a strong trend toward strengthened pro-
cedural protections for mentally ill individuals. Baxstrom, Specht, Humphrey, and Jackson
mandate that a state cannot constitutionally commit a mentally ill individual who has
committed a criminal act under proceedings involving new findings of fact on mental
illness and dangerousness unless that individual has access to the same procedural
safeguards afforded other commitment candidates in new fact-finding proceedings.
O'Connor provides that a commitment, to he constitutional, must be based on proof of
both dangerousness and mental illness. Mathews established that due process requires a
reviewing court to balance carefully each significant interest in a case raising a constitu-
tional challenge to state procedures. Finally, Addington requires that, in civil commitment
proceedings, the government must prove that a commitment candidate is mentally ill and
dangerous by "clear and convincing evidence" to commit him constitutionally. Although
the holdings in these cases hear directly on the petitioner's constitutional claims in Jones v.
United States, the Court failed to accord them adequate weight in its analysis of his claims.
In particular, the Court failed to use the due process balancing test it established in
Mathews or to follow O'Connor, which requires t hat proof of mental illness and dangerous-
ness support a constitutional commitment. A discussion of these errors in the Jones
Court's analysis follows the next section of the casenote, which reviews the majority
opinion in Jones along with Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion.
11. THE OPINIONS OF THE COURT IN JONES V. UNITED STATES
A. The Majority Opinion
After granting certiorari,'" in a five-to-four decision 128 the Supreme Court held in
Jones v. United States first, that the government may constitutionally commit an individual
124 Id, at 430-31.
I" Id. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
'" Id. at 432.
127 454 U.S. 1141 (1982).
128
 Justice Powell wrote the majority opinion. Jones, 463 U.S. at 356. Justice Brennan drafted a
dissenting opinion in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun joined. Id. at 371 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent. /d. at 387 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
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indefinitely on the basis of an insanity acquittal, and second, that the committed individ-
ual is not constitutionally entitled to release or recommit ment under procedures similar to
procedures used in civil commitment proceedings."" In reaching its holding, the Court
first addressed the petitioner's equal protectiOn claim that insanity acquittees arc entitled
to a jury trial at their statutorily mandated release hearings held fifty days following
commit mem.'" Because civil commitment candidates may have a jury at their' commit-
ment hearings, t he petitioner argued that, as a matter of equal protection, insanity
acquittees are entitled to have a jury at their fifty-day release hearings where the acquit-
lees' present mental states are considereciTor the first time in any proceeding."' Disagree-
ing with the petitioner's equal protection claim, the Couri held that because insanity
acquittees have the right to have a jury determine whether they were mentally ill when
they committed their crimes, they are not constitutionally entitled to a jury determination
of:present mental state at their commitment-release hearings."' According to the Court,
the relevant equal protection comparison does not involve contrasting the procedures
available at insanity acquittees' fitly-day release hearings with those available at civil-
commit ment hearings.'" Instead, the Court contrasted procedures available at criminal
trials, in particular, the right to a jury determination of sanity, with procedures available
at civil-commitment .hearings, and. held that the equal protection clause does not guaran-
tee the petitioner' the right to jury determinations of sanity at both his criminal trial and
his commitment-release hearing."'
Turning to the petitioner's clue process claims, the Court first considered the argu-
ment that continuing confinement originally based only on the finding at his criminal trial
that he was insane when he committed his misdemeanor violated clue process."' The
Court held that the finding of insanity at trial was sufficiently probative of continuing
insanity to provide a constitutional basis for commitment under the due process clause. 136
This holding was based on three grounds. First, the Court concluded t hat Congress could
reasonably have decided that, when an insanity acquittee has been found guilty of
committing a crime, an inference of continuing dangerousness exists.'" In so concluding,
•the Court rejected the petitioner's contention that t he commission of a nonviolent crime
was a constitutionally insufficient basis on which to base a presumption of continuing
dangerousness, and rioted that violence had never been a necessary prerequisite to a
constitutional comminnent." 8
 Second, the Court held that Congress could reasonably
determine that an insanity acquittal supports an inference that mental illness continues
"29 Id. at 369-70.
"" Id. at 362 & n.10.
" 1 Id. D.C. Coot: ANN. § 21-544 provides that a civil committee has the right to demand a jury
trial at his commitment proceedings. D.C. ConF. ANN. § 24-301(d) does not give insanity acquittees
the right to have a jury at their fifty-day commitment-release hearings.
I" Jones, 463 U.S. at 362-63 n.10.
13.7 	 •
.34 Id .
1" Id. at 362 - 63. The Court noted that the petitioner had based all of his claims in the Court of
Appeals on both equal protection and due process grounds. Id. at 362 -63 rt.10. The Court concluded
that, because the petitioner's equal protection claims essentially mirrored his due process claims, it
would analyze all but one of his claims under the due process clause. Id. at 364.
16 Id. at 364 -65.
1" Id. at 364.
138 Id. at 364-65.
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beyond the commission of a crime.' 59 In support of this second conclusion, the Court
observed that "it comports with common sense" to conclude that an individual whose
menial illness was sufficient to cause him to commit a crime is likely to remain mentally ill
and in need of treatment.'" Finally, the Court considered governmental interests in the
outcome of the proceedings. 141 Stressing the importance of administrative convenience,
the Court focused on the government's strong interest in avoiding new proceedings
requiring second jury trials for insanity acquittees at which the government would have to
prove present. mental illness.' The Court. concluded that the efficiency of proceedings is
an important factor which must be considered when evaluating the governmental inter-
ests in automatic commitment proceedings. 145 Following its analysis of the petitioner's due
process claims, the Court held that the court's finding of insanity' at the petitioner's
criminal trial was sufficiently probative of continuing insanity and dangerousness to
provide a constitutional basis for commitment under the due process clause." 4
The Court then considered the petitioner's argument that his continued commitment
was unconstitutional because the proper standard of proof of mental illness had not been
I" Id. at 364.
'4V Id. at 366.
141 Id.
'" Id. An extensive discussion of t he development of modern substantive due process analysis is
beyond the scope of this article. A limited overview of the Supreme Court's analyses in this area is
necessary, however, to facilitate understanding of the Jones Court's opinion.
For the past forty years in I he area or social and economic legislation, the Supreme Court has
generally upheld such legislation if known or "reasonably inferable" facts supported the legislative
judgment. See L. Tett;e,supre note 104, at 450. In the area of personal entitlements, however, recent
years have seen the development of a new type of substantive due process analysis. Such analysis is
characterized by the Court upholding legislation affecting individual rights only when the state has a
compelling interest underlying the allegedly unconstitutional legislation. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Red-
hail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-91 (1978) (state statute forbidding marriage of any resident noncustodial
parent obligated to support his minor children, unless resident obtained prior court approval of such
marriage, held to violate resident's equal protection rights); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56
(1973) (women's cousin utional right to obtain abortions recognized); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634-38 (1969) (statute denying public assistance to poor persons solely because they did not
meet jurisdiction's one-year residency requirement held unconstitutional under due process clause).
The Jaws Court, after scrutinizing the petitioner's due process claim, held that the government's
strong interest in automatic commitment following an insanity acquittal outweighed any interest the
petitioner would have in avoiding confinement. Jones, 463 U.S. at 366. On its face, the Court's
conclusion appears to he reasonable, In reaching its holding, however, the Court failed to weigh
carefully the petitioner's strong liberty interest against the government's interests. The Court has
repeatedly acknowledged the importance of an indivicl oafs interest. in liberty. See, e.g., id. at 361 -62;
Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 487-88 (1980) (state required to provide counsel to indigent mentally ill
prisoners upon whom state sought to impose involuntary psychiatric treatment); Addington, 441 U.S.
at 425 (state must bear burden of proving civil commitment candidates mentally ill by "clear and
convincing evidence"); O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575 (constitutional commitment must be grounded on
proof of mental illness and dangerousness). The petitioner's interest in avoiding confinement was
fundamental to his constitutional claims, yet the Jones Court failed to give careful consideration to
this strong liberty interest. See 463 U.S. at '361-67. Alt hough thejones Court ostensibly reached its
conclusion by fairly weighing the petitioner's interests in avoiding confinement against the govern-
ment's interests in automatic and indefinite commitment of insanity acquittees, its fact it applied a
truncated due process analysis to the petitioner's claims. See infra notes 225-46 and accompanying
text for further development of this criticism of the Jones Court's constitutional analysis.
193 Jones, 463 U.S. at 366.
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used at his trial. 145 The petitioner argued that the "clear and convincing evidence"
standard enunciated by the Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas-14" rather than the
"preponderance of the evidence" standard should have been used attrial.'"' Rejecting the
petitioner's argument, the Court held that the preponderance of the evidence standard
satisfies the requirements of due process in the criminal commitment, as opposed to civil
commitment., context."' In reaching this conclusion, the Court stated that there was no
reason for adopting the same standard of proof in civil and criminal commitments." 9
Distinguishing criminal commitments from their civil counterparts, the Jones Court. con-
cluded that the risk that a civil commitment candidate might be confined inerely for
idiosyncratic behavior, 15" one of its most important concerns in Addington, was absent in
the criminal commitment context.' The Jones Court observed that the Addington Court,
in light of its concern on this point, had deemed it inappropriate for a civil commitment
candidate to have to bear equally with society the risk of an erroneous commitment, and
had concluded that proof by "clear and convincing evidence" was required to protect civil
commitment candidates from unwarranted commitment merely based on idiosyncratic
behavior." Because an insanity acquittee raises the issue of insanity as an affirmative
defense at trial, and because commitment following a successful defense is based on the
finding at trial that the defendant committed his crime because he was mentally ill, the
Jones Court concluded that there is no danger that an insanity acquit tee will be committed
simply on the basis of idiosyncratic behavior.'" Consequently, the Court concluded that
determining an insanity acquitee's mental status at the time the crime was committed
under the preponderance of the evidence standard meets the requirements of due
process.'"
Finally, the Court addressed the petitioner's claim that, because he had been confined
for longer than the one-year maximum possible prison sentence for his crime, he was
emided to release or to reconuninnent in proceedings similar to those used in civil
comminnems. 155
 Initially, the Court observed that an insanity acquittee is entitled to
release when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous.' Stating that there is
no necessary correlation between severity of an acquittee's offense and length of time
necessary for recovery, the Court held that the length of the maximum possible prison
sentence for any crime is irrelevant to the duration and purpose of an insanity acquittee's
commit ment, and concluded that the petitioner was not entitled to release on the basis of -
this claim. ' 57
'" Id. at 366-67.
Addington, 441 U.S. at 433. See supra notes 111-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Addingion.
' 17 Jones, 463 U.S. at 366-67. See D.C. CODE ANN. § '24-301(j) (1981).
1417 Jones, 463 U.S. at 367-68.
' 49 Id. at 367.
' a" Addington, 441 U.S. at 427.
1" Jones, 463 U.S. at 367.
Id. ((looling Addington, 441 U.S. at 427).
15:1
'" Id. at 367-68.
'S5
	 at 368.
154 Id.
'" Id.
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B. The Dissenting Opinion of justice Brennan
Justice Brennan's dissent informs characterized the issue raised in this case as whether
an insanity acquittal alone is a constitutionally adequate ground for an involuntary
psychiatric commitment of indefinite duration,'" The outcome of the case, Justice Bren-
nan concluded, pivoted on the answer to the question of what standard and burden of
proof of menial illness and dangerousness are constitutionally required prior to commit-
ment following an insanity acquittal.' 59 Thus, Justice Brennan questioned whether, in
light of psychiatric uncertainty about the connection between an insanity acquittee's
mental illness and dangerousness at the time he commits his crime and his mental state
and dangerousness at the time of his trial and subsequent commitment, the government
could compel the acquittee to share equally with society the risk of an erroneous, in-
definite commitment.'"" Justice Brennan concluded that the government must at some
point bear the burden of proving that the petitioner is currently mentally ill and danger-
ous under the "clear and convincing evidence" standard.'" An insanity acquittal of a
single, nonviolent misdemeanor, Justice Brennan reasoned, is not a constitutionally
adequate substitute for the constitutional protections of proof' by the government of
present mental illness and dangerousness by clear and convincing evidence. t" 2 According
to Justice Brennan, the predictive value of nonviolent criminal behavior for future
. dangerousness is not well-established, but attempts by researchers to predict future
dangerousness on the basis of past dangerous acts are often extremely inaccurate. 1 tl3 In
addition, Justice Brennan concluded that the Court's decisions in prior cases involving
mentally ill offenders mandated that the petitioner have access to procedural safeguards
associated with civil commitment proceedings, including proof of continuing mental
illness and dangerousness by t he clear and convincing evidence standard at his commit-
ment hearings.""
Finally, Justice Brennan focused on the governmental interests served by the re-
quirement that insanity acquittees demonstrate recovered sanity by a "preponderance of
the evidence" to be released from confinement following their commitments.'" Although
' 59 Id. at '371 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Just ice Marshall and
Blackmun concurred with Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion. Id. at 371 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice Stevens' separate dissent is not discussed in the body of the at ticle. In Justice Stevens' opinion,
the petitioner was presumptively entitled to recommitment proceedings where the government must
bear the burden of proving continuing insanity by "clear and convincing evidence" once the
maximum prison sentence the petitioner might have received had he been convicted had expired. Id.
at 387 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
"9 Id. at 386 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1" Id. at 378-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 427).
"' Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1" Id. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5' Id. at 378-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For a review of research concerning the predictive
value aim insanity acquittal on future dangerous behavior, see Cocozza and Steadman, The Failure of
Psychiatric. Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 1084 (1976);
Dershowitz, 7'he Law of Dangerousness. : Some Fictions About Predictions, 23 J. LE4:Ai. Enuc. 24, 46-47
(1970); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 439, 444-47 (1974);
Note, Rule for an Exceptional Class: The Commitment and Release of Persons Acquitted of Violent Qllenses by
Reason of Insanity, '57 N.V.U. L. REV. 281, 295-99 (1982); Note, Estelle v. Smith and Psychiatric
Testimony: New Limits on Predicting Future Dangerousness, 33 BAYLOR L. Rev. 1015, 1022-28 (1981).
'" 463 U.S. at 375-76 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 65 Id. at 376-82 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra notes 235-46 and accompanying text for
further discussion of the Junes Court's treatment of the government's interest in automatic and
indefinite commitment following insanity acquittals.
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it acknowledged that the government has a . legitimate interest in efficient and accurate
commitment proceedings, Justice Brennan stressed that governmental interests in isolat-
ing, protecting, and treating mentally ill individuals were present in a number of past.
Supreme Court cases,'" Noting that, in those cases, the government's interests had not
outweighed the petitioners' interests in avoiding confinement., Justice Brennan concluded
that due process requires the government to justify the petitioner's continuing
-
 commit-
ment by "clear and convincing evidence."'" Findings of present insanity and dangerous-
ness, Justice Brennan observed, are quite distinct from findings made at an acquittee's
criminal trial that he was mentally ill and dangerous when the crime was committed.'"
Justice Brennan concluded that, at sonic point., the government must bear the burden of
proving that the petitioner is presently mentally ill and dangerous under the more
stringent "clear and convincing evidence" standard."
1.11, A CR ITI QUE OF JONES V. UNITED STATES
The Jones Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to either immediate release
from confinement or to recommitment under procedures similiar to civil commitments
which would afford hint the right to a jury determination of current insanity with the
government bearing the burden of proof by "clear and convincing evidence." 7° The
Court's analysis in fortes fails to support this conclusion for several reasons. First, the
Court unduly minimized the precedential value of the Court's prior decisions on the
rights of mentally ill offenders. Although none of its earlier decisions directly concerned
the constitutionality of commitment-release provisions for insanity acquittees, they sup-
port Jones' constitutional arguments that he was entitled to either immediate release or
recommitment. under proceedings where the government has the burden of proving
current. insanity by "clear and convincing evidence." Second, the Court. failed to ade-
quately consider Jones' claim t hat the proceedings under which he was committed formed
a constitutionally deficient basis for an automatic commitment of indefinite duration.
Specifically, the Court accorded very little weight to Jones' argument that, because he was
never given the opportunity to have a jury determine whether his mental illness con-
tinued beyond the time he committed his crime, he was constitutionally entitled to such a
determination following the expiration of" he maximum sentence he could have received
had he been sentenced. In addition, the Court's decision in O'Connor a. Donaldson man-
dates that a commitment, to pass constitutional muster, must he based on findings, and
not presumptions, of mental illness and dangerousness. Jones' commitment was
grounded only on the finding at his criminal trial that he committed a crime because of
mental illness, and not on the finding that his mental illness continued up to the time of
his criminal trial, or on findings at any point prior to his commitment-release hearing held
fifty days following commitment that he was dangerous. Under O'Connor, therefore,
Jones' initial commitment was unconstitutional. Through its inadequate analysis of these
constitutional claims, the Court incorrectly concluded that a commitment of indefinite
duration may be based constitutionally on a finding at a defendant's criminal trial that he
'" Id, at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); O'Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Mix:in-on] v. Herold,
383 U.S. 107 (1966),
"7 Jones, 463 U.S. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
1 §'" Id. at 382-83 11.17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Iela
10 Id. at 368.
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committed his crime because he was mentally ill. Following its precedents in this area, the
Court should have concluded that Jones' initial commit ment was unconstitutional because
it was not. based on findings that his mental illness continued up to the time of his trial and
t hat he was dangerous when commit ted. In addition, the Court. only superficially analyzed
the petitioner's claim t hat the District of Columbia's commitment scheme is impermissibly
punitive because it automatically commits insanity acquittees solely on the ground that
they committed crimes and that their crimes were committed because the acquinees were
mentally ill, while individuals are civilly committed only after proceedings establish that
they are currently mentally ill and dangerous. Because this argument goes direct ly to the
validity of the District of Columbia's commitment. scheme, and because the lower courts in
this case concluded that its resolution was crucial to their decisions on t he constitutionality
of the statute, t helones Court should have carefully analyzed this argument. Finally, by
focusing the majority of its analysis on the government's interests involved in Jones while
curtailing its consideration of t he petitioner's interest s, t he Court misapplied the Mathews.
v. Eldridge due process balancing test,''' and failed to accord the petitioner an adequate
review of his claims. The filial result of the Court's abbreviated and inadequate analysis of
the petitioner's constitutional challenge to the District of Columbia's criminal commit-
ment scheme is an unwarranted reversal of the prior Supreme Court trend toward
strengthened procedural protections for mentally ill offenders.
A. The Jones Court's Use of Supreme Court Precedent Affecting the Rights of Mentally
Offenders
Although no Supreme Court cases explicitly delineate those rights which are con-
stitutionally guaranteed to defendants who successfully raise the insanity defense, a
number of Supreme Court cases have examined the general question of what rights are
available to mentally ill individuals in the civil commitment context. The holdings in these
cases support the petitioner's claim intones that he was entitled either to release following
the expiration of the maximum possible prison sentence he could have received had he
been sentenced or to recommitment under procedures similiar to those used in civil
commitments. In Brash-um v. Herold, for example, the Supreme Court. concluded that the
state had to provide the petitioner, a prisoner nearing the end of a prison sentence for
assault, with the same procedural safeguards other civil commitment candidates received
before it could constitutionally commit him.'" The Court. held t.hat the petitioner was
denied equal protection both because he did not have the right to a jury review of the
determination about his sanity and because he was denied a judicial determination that he
was dangerously insane."' In Specht v. Patterson, another case involving an involuntary
commitment, the Court held that the petitioner was unconstitutionally committed to a
171 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. See supra notes 105 - 10 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of Mathews.
175 Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 110 - 11. The/ones Court merely alluded toBasstrom in a footnote, where
it noted that. Baxstrom neither involved an insanity acquittee nor discussed the constitutionally
permissible length of an insanity acquittee's commitment. See supra text accompanying notes 57.62
for a discussion of Baxstrom.
" Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at I 10-11. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion intones concluded that the
primary difference bet weenfones andBaxstrom was that the petitioner intones admitted that his crime
was "the product" of his mental illness. Jones, 463 U.S. at 371; cf. Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 110.
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treatment facility for sexual offenders.'" The Spedit Court concluded that the petitioner-
was denied due process and equal protection because his conviction was the basis for a
separate sentencing proceeding involving new findings of fact. about whether the
petitioner was an habitual offender and mentally ill or dangerous to the public.' 7 '
Consequently, the Court held that the proceeding which determined whether the
petitioner was an habitual criminal and mentally ill or a dangerous must. afford the
petitioner stronger procedural protections."'"
In both Baxstrom and Spec/a, the Court held that the petitioners had not been given
their constitutionally guaranteed rights to full and fair determinations of insanity or
dangerousness under the states' commitment procedures.'" The Court. determined in
both cases that the petitioners had a right to procedural safeguards afforded commit went
candidates who had not committed criminal acts. 178
 These two cases are similar toJaites
one significant. respect. In both cases the mentally ill petitioners, who had also been
convicted of crimes, were afforded fewer procedural protections than commitment can-
didates who had not committed crimes. In Baxstrom and Spechi the Court held that the
petitioners, whose commitment proceedings involved new findings of fact on the issues of
mental illness and dangerousness, were constitutionally entitled to the same procedural
protections at their commitment hearings as commitment candidates who were not
convicted of criminal act s.' 79
 The Court justified its holding that the petitioner inJones was
not entitled to comparable procedures in part by observing that fact-finding on the issues
of current mental illness and dangerousness had taken place at the petitioner's fifty-day
release hearing, where he was found to he currently mentally ill and dangerous."'" In
Jones, however, the petitioner's initial commitment was based only on the presumption
that. the mental illness which had caused him to commit a crime continued beyond the
time of his criminal act. up to the time he was committed, and also upon a presumption of
dangerousness arising automatically simply because he had committed a crinne.' 8 ' Unlike
the petitioners' initial commitments in Baxstrom and Specht, therefore, the petitioner's
"4 Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 610-11 (1967). See supra text accompanying notes 63-71
for a discussion of Spechi.
175 Id. at 608-11.
' 76 Id. at 610-11.
'" Specht, 386 U.S. at 610-11; Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 110.
17" Speck, 386 U.S. at 610-11; Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 110.
175 Specht, 386 U.S. at 610-11; Raxslrom, 383 U.S. at 110.
in Jones, 463 U.S. at 360.
141 Id. at 364. See also S. REF. No. 1170, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955) (reflecting the con-
gressional determination that mental illness may be presumed to continue from the time a crime is
committed to the time of commitment to a mental institution). The Jones Court quoted language
from Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 714 (1962), as supporting the theory that, in every case,
individuals who commit crimes are dangerous, and that their dangerousness may be presumed to
continue from the time their crimes were committed. A fuller quote of the same language from
Lynch, however, fails to support the Court's reading of the case. See Lynch, 369 U.S. at 714, where the
Court stated:
But the fact that the accused has pleaded guilty or that, overcoming some defense other
than insanity, the Government has established that he committed a criminal act consti-
tutes only strong evidence that his continued liberty could imperil "the preservation of
public peace." It no more rationally justifies his indeterminate commitment to a mental
institution on a bare reasonable doubt as to past sanity than would any other cogent
proof of possible jeopardy to "the rights of persons and of property" in any civil
commitment.
May 1985]	 CASENOTES	 799
commitment in Jones was based on presumptions and not on findings of current menial
illness and dangerousness. Although Jones' continued confinement after his fifty-day
hearing followed a judicial determination of mental illness and dangerousness, his initial
presumption-based confinement did not meet. the Court's requirements in Baxstrom and
Specht that all commit meat candidates have similar procedural protections whether or not
they also have committed crimes. Findings of current insanity and dangerousness arc
different from the finding made at Jones' trial that he committed his crime because he was
mentally ill; no further investigation about the petitioner's mental state or potential
dangerousness was made prior to his automatic commitment following his successful
insanity defense. Jones was not committed under proceedings which followed the
Ba.xstrom and Specht requirement that mentally ill individuals who have also committed
crimes receive procedural safeguards during their commitment proceedings similar to
those procedures available to commitment candidates who have not committed criminal
acts. Under Baxstrom and Specht, therefore, Jones' initial commitment proceedings were
constitutionally inadequate, and the adequacy of the procedures available to him at his
fifty-day release hearing did not adequately compensate for this initial constitutional
infirmity.
The Court's holding in Humphrey v. Cady also supports Jones' claim that he should be
immediately released or recommitted under procedures similar to those available when
individuals are civilly committed.'" In Humphrey, the Court held that the petitioner's
claim that his recommitment for a five year period, made wit bout a jury, denied him equal
protection with respect to other compulsory commitment candidates warranted an
evidentiary hearing and remanded the case.'" Humphrey's situation closely resembles
that of Jones after his initial release hearing. Both Humphrey and Jones had committed
crimes as a result of mental disorders, and at the lime t hey challenged the proceedings
under which they had been committed both had been confined for longer than the
maximum prison sentence available for the crime committed.' 84 The Humphrey Court
concluded that the petitioner's challenge to the constitutionality of his commitment
proceedings warranted an evidentiary hearing because he had not been given the same
procedural safeguards afforded other involuntary commitment candidates. "5 This hold-
ing fully supports Jones' claim that, because he had not been given procedural protections
available to civil commitment candidates, he was entitled to release or to a redetermina-
tion of his commitment's continuing validity.'"''
One other case supports Jones' claim that all mentally ill individuals committed under
procedures at some point involving new findings of fact on the issues of current insanity
and dangerousness are constitutionally entitled to essentially the same procedural protec-
tions. In Jackson v. Indiana, the Court evaluated the scope of rights constitutionally
182 Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 506 (1972). See supra notes 72 - 83 and accompanying text
For a discussion of Humphrey.
i83 Id. at 506. No printed record of the disposition of the petitioner's case on remand exists.
1 " Jones, 463 U.S. at 376 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 506-07. Justice
Brennan observed in Jones that Humphrey's situation was almost precisely identical to that of Jones
after his 1977 habeas corpus bearing. 463 U.S. at 376 (Brennan, J., dissenting)..
' 8' Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 506.
on TheJones Court viewed Humphrey as not controlling primarily because it did not involve an
insanity acquittee. Jones, 463 U.S. at 369-70 n.19. Both cases, however, concerned individuals who
either were committed to mental institutions or were commitment candidates, and both raised issues
regarding the constitutional adequacy of available procedural protections. See id. at 376.
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guaranteed to an individual who had been indefinitely commit ted.'" Injackson, the Court
concluded that it was unlikely that the petitioner would ever be found competent to stand
trial because of his mental deficiency, deafness and extremely poor communication
skills."8
 The Court held that the petitioner was denied equal protection because he was
not afforded access to procedural safeguards given to persons civilly committed because
of mental illness or feeble-mindedness.'" According to I he Court, the petitioner had also
been denied due process because the nature and duration of his indefinite confinement
until certified "sane- were not reasonably related to the purpose of his commitment —
temporary confinement until found competent 10 stand trial. 19"
• The Jones Court distinguished Jackson on the ground that there never was any
affirmative proof in Jackson that the petitioner had committed any crime or was danger-
ous.'"' Although this factual distinction between the cases exists, the Jackson holding
nevertheless - supports Jones' argument that the government cannot constitutionally
commit a person indefinitely unless he has access to the same procedural safeguards
afforded persons civilly committed because of mental illness or infirmity.
The holdings in Baxstrom, Specht, Humphrey, and Jackson all support the conclusion
that a state cannot constitutionally commit a person indefinitely based on proceedings
involving new fact-finding unless that person has access to the same procedural
safeguards afforded persons civilly committed.' 92
 Required constitutional guarantees
include the right to procedures which provide a meaningful opportunity to he heard
when new findings of fact on t he issue of current insanity and dangerousness are raised at
commitment proceedings. 193 Each of these decisions supports Jones' argument that,
because he was not given certain procedural protections afforded civil commitment
candidates at proceedings establishing whether they are currently mentally ill and
dangerous, he was constitutionally entitled to either immediate release from confinement
or recommitment under such procedures.
In addition to challenging his continuing confinement on the ground that, at his
fifty-day release heating where the issues of current mental illness and dangerousness
were considered for the first time, he did not receive procedural protections available to
civil commitment candidates, Jones raised a separate challenge to the constitutional
adequacy of the District of Columbia's criminal commitment. scheme. The petitioner
argued that his confinement, which was based on presumptions and not findings of
mental illness and dangerousness, did not meet the requirement enunciated by the Court
in O'Connor v. Donaldson that a constitutional commitment be grounded on findings of
current Mental illness and dangerousness. 194
In O'Connor v. Donaldson, t he Supreme Court addressed the question of what menial
1 " Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 725
- 26 (1972). See supra notes 84-93 and accompanying
text for further discussion of Jackson.
I" Jackson, 406 U.S. at 725 - 26.
' 89 Id. at 729-30.
' 99 Id. at 737-38.
19 ' Jones, 463 U.S. at 364 n.12.
I92 See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 729
-30, 738 - 39; Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 508; Specht, 386 U.S. at 610 - 11;
Baxstrom, '383 U.S. at 111 - 12.
' 93 See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 729-30, 737-39; Humphrey, 405 U.S. at 508-11; Specht, 386 U.S. at
610 - 11; Baxstrom, 383 U.S. at 111-12.
19' Jones, 463 U.S. at 366 -67, 371. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (discussed
supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text).
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state must he proved to confine a menially ill individual constitutionally.'" The O'Connor
Court concluded that a constitutional commit ntent must be based on the findings that the
individual the state seeks to commit is presently both mentally ill ;111(1 currently danger-
ous.'"
Jones was committed under proceedings which did not base the commitment of an
insanity acquittee on findings of mental illness and dangerousness, but rather on pre-
sumptions that mental illness and dangerousness exist currently.'" In the District of
Columbia, acquittal by reason of insanity requires proof that the accused committed a
crime because he was mentally ill. '"" On the basis of an insanity acquittal, the individual is
automatically committed.'" No findings of dangerousness or current mental illness are
required prior to commitment.'" When enacting the District of Columbia criminal com-
mitment statute, Congress determined that an insanity acquittal permits inferences of
both present dangerousness and mental illness."' O'Connor, however, requires that there
be findings, and not merely presumptions, of both menial illness and dangerousness
before an individual can be constitutionally committed."' Alt hough the Court in Jones
approved of Congress' determination that an insanity acquittal raises an inference of
present. dangerousness and mental illness,'" O'Connor mandates that findings and not.
simply inferences of both dangerousness and mental illness be made prior to commit-
195 O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 574 - 77.
195 Id. at 575 - 76,
See Jones. 463 U.S. at 364..
1" See supra note 25.
'" D.C. Cons ANN. § 24-301(d)(1) (1981).
2th' Id, See supra note 181.
"1 foams, 463 U.S. at 366 (citing 1 -1.R. Rim. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1970)). Current
psychiatric research on the prediction of future dangerousness indicates that it is difficult if not
impossible to predict whether an insanity acquittee, if released, will commit another crime. This
predictive uncertainty exists even if the released acquittee continues to he mentally ill following his
release. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 378-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 163 for sources
reviewing the research on the predictive value of an insanity acquittal on future dangerousness.
Discussing this predictive uncertainty, Justice Brennan intones concluded that it is unknown whether
nonviolent criminal behavior is a statistically valid predictor of future nonviolent behavior, much less
of future violent behavior. Id. at 379 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Following a review of research
available on this question, Justice Brennan concluded that it is unlikely that insanity acquit tees
display a rate of future dangerousness which is. higher than that of civil committees with similar
arrest records, or t han that of individuals convicted of crimes who are found mentally ill following
their convictions. Id. at 380-81 (Brennan, j., dissenting). The majority in fortes, however, dismissed
the value of psychological research in this area, and stated:
[•ie do not agree with the suggestion that Congress power to legislate in this area
depends on the research conducted by the psychiatric community „ . the lesson we
have drawn is not that the government may not act in the face of this uncertainty [in
diagnosing rnentil illness and dangerousness", but rather that courts should pay par-
ticular deference to reasonable legislative judgments.
Id. at '365 n.13. The petitioner injuries, however, did not claim that Congress' ability to legislate in this
area depends on current psychiatric research. Like Justice Brenirtn's dissent in Jones, he merely
noted that psychiatric research in this area does not support the predictive value of prior dangerous
acts, and that Congress failed to cite arty empirical evidence indicating that mentally ill individuals
who have committed crimes are likely to commit future dangerous acts when it enacted D.C. Cons:
ANN. § 24 -301(d). Id. See Reply Brief for Petitioner at 13, Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
O'Connor - , 422 U.S. at 575-76.
'"3 Jones, 463 U.S. at 364-65.
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mem.'" Because no findings were made that Jones was mentally ill or dangerous until his
fifty-day release hearing, his original commitment was unconstitutional under O'Connor.
The Jones Court nowhere addressed this constitutional issue, in part because it charac-
terized the issues raised in Jones as not involving a direct challenge to the District of
Columbia's criminal commitment scheme:2 ' 1 ' Under O'Connor, however, the petitioner's
original commitment was unconstitutional because it was not based on findings of current
mental illness and dangerousness. The constitutional infirmity of Jones' commitment was
not overcome by the finding at his fifty-clay release hearing that he was mentally ill and
dangerousness because his initial commitment. was based on presumptions and not
findings of the requisite mental conditions.
The petitioner in Jones also claimed that, because he had been confined for longer
than the maximum possible prison sentence for his crime, he was entitled to either
immediate release or to recommitment under proceedings similar to those used in civil
commitment proceedings. 2 "6 Such recommitment proceedings, the petitioner asserted,
should include a jury determination of current insanity with the government bearing the
burden of proof by "clear and convincing evidence." 2"° The petitioner based his claims for
these specific procedural protections on Addington v. Texas, where the Court, held that the
government must bear the burden of proving insanity by "clear and convincing evidence"
in civil commitment proceedings.'" In reaching this conclusion, the Addington Court. used
the due process balancing test which it had enunciated in Mathews v. Eldridge.'" Mathews
requires that a court reviewing the constitutionality of a governmental action must
balance three factors.'" These factors are, first, the private interest affected by the
challenged governmental action, second, the government's interest in the challenged
governmental function, including the monetary and administrative burdens which in-
creased procedural protections would require, and third, the risk of error which might be
caused by the challenged procedure weighed against the increased protection brought
about. by strengthening available procedures.'" In Addington, after weighing the state's
interests in accurate and efficient commitment proceedings against the petitioner's inter-
est in avoiding commitment, the Court concluded that civil commitment. candidates'
interests in liberty and autonomy outweighed the states interests in isolating, protecting
and treating mentally ill individuals. 212
O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575-76.
205 Jones, 463 U.S. at 362. The Jones Court characterized the primary issue in this case as
whether, because he had beers committed for longer than the maximum possible prison term for his
crime, the petitioner had the right to unconditional and immediate release or to procedures available
in civil recommitment proceedings. Id. at 363. The Jones dissent, however, framed the issue more
broadly as encompassing a direct challenge to the constitutional adequacy of the District of Colum-
bia's criminal commitment scheme, specifically, whether an insanity acquittal alone constitutes a
constitutionally adequate basis for an automatic commitment of indefinite duration. Id. at 371. The
Jones Court's narrow framing of the issue does an injustice to the question raised by the petitioner
about the constitutional adequacy of the District of Columbia's criminal commitment scheme.
2 "6 Jones, 463 U.S. at 363.
207 Id. at 362-63; id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2 E"e Addington, 441 U.S. at 433. See supra notes I11 - 26 and accompanying text for a further
discussion of Addington.
2" Addington, 441 U.S. at 425 - 27. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. See supra notes 105 - 10 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Mathews.
2 " Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
2 " Id.
212 Addington, 441 U.S. at 425-27.
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After considering the petitioners's claims in light of Addington, t heJones Court held
that due process did not require the government to meet the Addington "clear and
convincing evidence" standard for insanity acquittees." 3 Distinguishing Jones from Ad-
dington, iheJones Court concluded that "critical concerns" present in the civil commitment.
context were either reduced or absent in the criminal commitment. context, and that no
reason existed for requiring the same standard of proof in each case."' The first. critical
concern the Court discussed in Jones was its fear in Addington that a civil commitment
candidate might be confined merely for idiosyncratic behavior."' This concerti, the Jones
Court concluded, underpinned the Addington Court's holding that. civil commitment.
candidates should not share equally with society the risk of error of erroneous commit.-
meat.""' Addressing this concern, the tones Court reasoned that, because insanity acquit-
tees themselves plead and prove that they are not guilty by reason of insanity ofthe crimes
with which they are charged, there is a sound basis for diminished concern about the risk
that insanity acquittees will be committed erroneously.'" The second concern that the
Jones court found to he present in Addington but not. in Jones which distinguished the two
cases involved the stigma attached to commitment." 8 Reasoning that the verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity alone stigmatizes an insanity acquittee, the Jones Court
concluded that commitment following an insanity acquittal causes little additional stig-
matization. 2 ' 9
The Jones Court's analysis when distinguishing concerns critical to its Addington
decision from those critical toJones is not convincing for three reasons. First, an individual
is not likely to be committed civilly simply because of idiosyncratic behavior, because
O'Connor mandates that an individual must be found both mentally ill and dangerous
before he can be committed constitutionally.""" Because of this mandate, there was little
danger in either Additq,Yton orfones that the petitioners would have been committed simply
because of idiosyncratic behavior. Under O'Connor, in both civil and criminal commitment.
contexts, individuals must. be found mentally ill and dangerous, and not. merely odd or
bizarre, to he committed constitutionally. Second, the Court has repeatedly acknowledged
that individuals who have been found mentally ill nevertheless have a strong interest in
avoiding involuntary confinement.'" The Jones Court's determination that an insanity
acquit.tee's only interest in not being involuntarily committed is one of avoiding the stigma
commitment adds to an insanity acquittal was thus incorrect, if not irrational. Common
sense dictates t hat under many circumstances an insanity acquittee would desire to avoid
not only the added stigma attached to commitment but also the concommitant infringe-
ment on his personal liberty which commitment entails. Third, the government's interests
in isolating, protecting and treating mentally ill persons were equally present intones and
Addington, and the petitioners' interests in avoiding confinement were the same in both
cases.""" Conceivably, to protect society from dangerously mentally ill offenders, the
government might have.a stronger interest in insuring that insanity acquittees are corn-
"" Jones, 463 U.S. at 367-68.
2 " Id. at 367.
215 Id. (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 426-27).
216 Id. (citing Addington 441 U.S. at 426 - 27).
217 Jones, 463 U.S. at 367.
2 " Id. at 367 11.16.
219 id.
220 See O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575 - 76.
" 1 See,e.g.,Jones, 463 U.S. at 383-84 (Brennan, J., dissenting); O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 575 (1975).
"" Jones, 463 U.S. at 377, 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
804	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 26:779
mined than it does in guaranteeing commitment of mentally ill individuals who have not
also committed crimes. In the District of Columbia, however, a successful insanity defense
merely indicates that t he insanity acquinee committed his crime because he was mentally
ill; commitment following an insanity acquittal is automatic. Findings on present mental
illness or dangerousness are not made prior to the time insanity acquittees are committed,
but rat her are made for the first time nearly two months following commitment.. Because
no findings were made in Jones prior to the petitioner's commitment that he was either
mentally ill or dangerous when committed, he argued that the government's only con-
ceivable justification for committing him automatically following his criminal trial was to
ensure that he did not escape confinement entirely.""' This argument is particularly
compelling in the petitioner's case, since he was automatically committed following an
acquittal by reason of insanity of the nonviolent. crime of attempted shoplifting."' Even if
the automatic commitment of insanity acquittees is not inherently punitive because no
findings of current mental illness or dangerousness are made prior to commitment,
despite what. the petitioner suggested, the absence of evidence of continuing menial
illness or dangerousness prior to commitment indicates that the government can have no
stronger interest in committing insanity acquittees to protect society than it does in
confining civil commitment candidates.
A commitment candidate's interest in avoiding confinement has been repeatedly
acknowledged by the Court." 5
 By virtually ignoring the petitioner's liberty interest• in
avoiding confinement and by failing to weigh all interests involved in his case, the Jones
Court denied t he petitioner a constitutionally adequate review of his due process claims.
The last section of the article will analyze the Jones Court's due process review of the
petitioner's claims. It will first examine the elements of a constitutional due process review
enunciated by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge ," 6 and will compare the clue process
analysis used in Jones with that used in Mathews. The article will then review the Jones
Court's treatment of the petitioner's equal protection claim, and will conclude with a
discussion of t he changes in future cases involving mentally ill offenders which may follow
in the wake of the Court's decision in Jones.
2"
 Id. at 362-63. See also Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d. 364 (D.C. 1981); Jones v. United
States, 411 A.2d 624 (D.C. 1980); Jones v. United States. 396 A.2d 183 (D.C. 1978); supra notes 37-52
and accompanying text,
22' See supra notes 163 and 201 and infra note 237 for discussion of the predictive value of a
nonviolent crime on future dangerous behavior.
"3
 See, e.g., Jones, 463 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The Court has repeatedly voiced
concern about the loss of liberty which occurs when individuals are confined in mental institutions.
See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979). Vitek involved
a due process challenge to a Nebraska statute allowing the transfer of prisoners to mental hospitals if
they were found to be mentally ill. The Vi Lek Court reasoned that such an involuntary transfer
implicated a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 445 U.S. at 482-83. Addressing its attention to
a different aspect of involuntary commitment, the Vilek Court stated:
[t]he loss of liberty produced by an involuntary commitment is more than a loss of
freedom from confinement. It is indisputable that commitment to a mental hospital
"can engender adverse social consequences to the individual" and that 1w]hether we
label this phenomenon 'stigma' or choose to call it something else ... we recognize that
it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual."
Id. at 492 (ginning Addington, 441 U.S. at 425
-26).
22' 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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B. The Court's Constitutional Analysis in Jones v. United States
The Court prefaced its due process analySis in Jones with the statement that commit-
ment "constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process prolec-
tiOn.""IThe Court fort her observed that, in light of this protected liberty interest, a state
must have a constitutionally adequate purpose for commit ment. 2 '8 Although these decla-
rations prefatory to the Court's analysis of the petitioner's claims are true, they do not set
out the elements necessary for a constitutionally adequate commitment.
The principal elements of a constitutionally adequate due process analysis were
enunciated by the Court in Mathews v. Eldridge.' 9 The Mathews Court. specified three
factors which must he balanced by a reviewing court to insure that the challenged
governmental action comports with the requirements of due process.` 31 The first factor
that must be weighed is the private interest affected by the challenged governmental
action."' Second, the risk of an erroneous ()income involved in using the challenged
procedure must he weighed against the value of strengthened procedural safeguards."'
The final factor to be evaluated is the government's interest in the challenged lune( ion.""
Examination of this interest. may also include consideration of fiscal and administrative
costs which additional or more complicated procedures would involve."'
When evaluating the petitioner's due process claim that he was entitled either to
immediate release from confinement or to recommitment under procedures similar to
those used in civil commitment proceedings, the Jones Court failed to balance all sig-
nificant. interests involved in the case before it.. Most importantly, the Court.neglected to
weigh carefully the petitioner's strong interest in avoiding confinement. Thus, when
analyzing the petitioner's claims the Court first examined the governmental interests
present. 235 Based in part on the legislative history of the District. of Columbia's criminal
commitment statute, the Court concluded that the government has both reasonable and
legitimate reasons for automatically committing mentally ill persons for an indefinite
period of time following acquittals by reason of insanity."" The Court. explicitly validated
Congress' determination that commitment may automatically follow a successful insanity
defense, maintaining that this determination was based on "reasonable" and "common
sense" inferences of continuing mental illness and dangerousness."' The Jones Court also
227 Jones, 463 U.S. at 361 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 425).
"" Id. at. 361 (quoting O'Connor, 422 U.S. at 574).
2" 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Mathews.
230 424 U.S. at 335.
23 ' Id, at 335.
"2 Id.
zsa Id.
'24 Id.
235 Jones, 463 U.S. at 366.
"6 Id. an 364 (citing 11.R. REP. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1970); S. REP, No. 1170, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955)).
"7 Id. at 366. In validating Congress' determination t h at an insanity acquittal provides a
constitutionally adequate basis on which to base presumptions of mental illness and dangerousness
continuing up to the time of commitment, the Court concluded t hat proof that a person committed a
crime because he was mentally ill provided "common sense" grounds- on which to infer continued
dangerousness and mental illness. See id. at 364-66. In Jones, the petitioner was acquitted of the
misdemeanor of attempted petit larceny. Common sense indicates that an insanity acquittal of
attempted petit larceny provides little if any support for an inference of continuing mental illness
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examined the government's interest in automatic commitment proceedings which is based
on fiscal and administrative considerations, focusing principally on the government's
interest. in avoiding costly commitment hearings. 23" Lastly, the Court reviewed the gov-
ernment's interest. in confining mentally ill persons indefinitely for treatment until they
recover their menial health or are no longer dangerous.'" The Court. then turned to an
examination of the petitioner's interests, consisting of a foot note reference to the minimal
effect that the stigma associated with commitment. has on insanity acquit tees compared
with its greater impact on civil committees. 24° Concluding its limited evaluation of the
petitioner's interests, the Court stated that a criminal defendant who successfully raises
the insanity defense is stigmatized by the verdict itself, and I he commitment which follows
automatically causes little additional harm."'
When evaluating the petitioner's claims, the Jones Court nowhere weighed his con-
stitutionally guaranteed liberty interest. prior to holding that he was not entitled either to
immediate release or to recommitment. under procedures similar to those used in civil
commitment proceedings. "The fortes dissent, on the other hand, balanced each important
interest involved in t he case, focusing in particular on the petitioner's liberty interest, and
not simply on the petitioner's interest in avoiding the stigma associated with involuntary
commitment. 42 The dissent observed that the facts of past criminal behavior plus mental
illness do not justify indefinitely committing an individual without affording him the
minimum due process standards associated with civil commit met-11. 243 Thus, after balanc-
ing the government's interest in efficient and accurate commitment proceedings against
both the petitioner's liberty interest and his interest in avoiding stigma, t heJones dissent
concluded that., at some point, the government must bear the burden of proving continu-
ing insanity by the Addington standard of "clear and convincing evidence. "G44
TheJones dissent's due process analysis, unlike that of the majority, reflect s a consid-
eration of each important interest involved in i he case, as Mathews mandates. First, the
dissent's conclusion that the petitioner should either be recommitted under civil commit-
ment proceedings or immediately released is required under the Court's holding in
Mathews that a commit ment, to be constitutional, must he based on findings of mental
illness and dangerousness. Thus, the Court's emphasis on the importance of the govern-
ment's interests together with its incomplete consideration of the petitioner's interests is,
if not unconstitutional under Mathews, impermissibly skewed toward the government's
position that the procedural safeguards afforded the petitioner were constitutionally
sufficient., Most importantly, when compared with the petitioner's constitutionally pro-
tected liberty interest, the government's interest in inexpensive and efficient proceedings,
although one factor to be weighed, is certainly not determinative on the question whether
to recognize a constitutional right to de novo commitment proceedings following an
and dangerousness. See id, at 379-80 (Brennan, J., dissenting) and sources cited therein. Indeed, the
legislative history relied on by the Court to uphold the congressionally mandated presumptions of
continuing mental illness and dangerousness speaks of' 'serious criminal charges . ." See id. at 369
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 91-907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1970)).
"" Id. at 366.
239
 Id. at 368.
"" Id. at 367 n.16.
241 Id.
242
 Id. at 377-86 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
243 Id. at 375 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
'44
 Id. at 382 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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insanity acquittal. Second, the Court engaged in speculation when stating that, "instead of
focusing on the critical question whether t he acquittee has recovered, t he new proceeding
[which the petitioner urged] likely would have to relitigate much of the criminal trial." 245
As the fortes dissent observed, however, issues of current mental illness and dangerous-
ness are distinct from findings made at criminal trials. 246 Furthermore, no criminal trial
took place in Jones because the petitioner successfully raised I he insanity defense prior to
trial. In summary, because the dissent, unlike the majority, fairly weighed the questions
raised in Jones. concerning the constitutional validity of the District of Columbia's criminal
commitment scheme as required by Mathews, its conclusion that the petitioner was con-
stitutionally entitled to immediate release or to recommitment should have prevailed.
In addition to his due process argument, the petitioner raised an equal protection
claim."' The petitioner contended that because civil commitment candidates have the
right to a jury at their commitment hearings,' insanity acquit tees also have a right to a
jury determination of current insanity at their fifty-day release hearings. 249 Addressing
the petitioner's equal protection claim in a footnote, the Court concluded that the relevant
equal protection comparison was between the availability of a jury at the acquittec's trial
and the availability of a jury at t he civil commitment hearing.''"
At. no time does an insanity acquittee in the District of Columbia have the right to a
jury determination of present insanity, althciugh civil containment candidates have that
right."' The function of a jury at the criminal trial, in part, is to determine whether the
accused committed the crime as a result of insanity."' The jury at the criminal trial does
not also determine whether the individual's insanity continues from the time of the
crime's commission until the time of the criminal trial:433 Unlike civil commitment candi-
dates, therefore, insanity acquinees in the District of Columbia are not. afforded the
opportunity to have a jury determine whet her they are presently insane prior to commit-
ment. Consequently, denying the petitioner in Jones the right to a jury at his Fifty-day'
release hearing was not justified by the fact that insanity acquit tees have a right to a jury
determination of the mental state which existed at the time they committed their
crimes.'" A finding that a person has committed a crime because of mental illness cannot.
substitute for a finding that the individual is mentally ill at the time of the trial and should
be committed for treatment.
24' Id, at 366.
24" Id. at 383 it,17 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2" Id. at 362 n.10. Melones Court chose to consider all but one of the pet it loner's claims under
the due process clause rather than the equal protection clause, even though the petitioner had based
his claims on both due process and equal protection grounds. In rejecting equal protection as a
separate basis on which to evaluate the petitioner's claims, the Court reasoned that if, under the due
process clause, the petitioner had no right to Addingion procedural protections, it necessarily followed
that a rational basis exists for equal protection purposes to distinguish between civil commitment
candidates and insanity acquittees. as this article concludes, the Jones Court's analysis is
constitutionally flawed, then according to justice Brennan's dissenting opinion, which concluded that
there was no constitutional basis for distinguishing between civil and criminal committees when
defining constitutionally adequate grounds For an indefinite commit ment, separate equal protection
grounds exist on which to evaluate the petitioner's claims.
2" D.C. CODE ANN. § 2f-544 (1981).
"' Jones, 463 U.S. at 362 n.10.
250 Id .
See supra note 131.
' " D.C. Coot: ANN. § 24-301(c) (1981).
▪ Id.
254 Jones. 463 U.S. at 362-63 n.10 (citing Jones v. United States, 432 A.2d 364, 373 (D.C, 1981)).
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CONC LUS 1 0 N
The Supreme Court's opinion in Jones v. Waled States is analytically flawed in several
critical respects. First, the holdings in prior Supreme Court cases concerning the rights of
mentally ill offenders support the conclusion that the petitioner in Jones was entitled
either to immediate release or to recommitment under procedures similar to those
available to civil commitment candidates. The Court accorded little weight to relevant case
law in this area, ignoring earlier opinions in which it ruled that, if challenged commitment
proceedings involve new findings of fact., individuals committed u nder these proceedings
must have available the same procedural protections afforded other commitment candi-
dates. Second, because a commitment, to be constitutional, must be based on findings and
not simply on presumptions of mental illness and dangerousness, the petitioner's auto-
matic commitment following his insanity acquittal was unconstitutional. In upholding the
validity of the procedures under which the petitioner was cm -mitred, the Jones Court
failed to adhere to this procedural requirement which the Court in its earlier cases had
concluded was necessary for a constitutionally valid commitment. Finally, due process
requires that a court reviewing a constitutional challenge to governmental proceedings
carefully weigh each important interest involved in the case. The Jones Court, by neglect-
ing to weigh the petitioner's liberty interest when analyzing - his challenge to the District of
Columbia's criminal conunitment scheme, afforded the petitioner an impermissibly ab-
breviated analysis of his claims prior to reaching its conclusion that he was not entitled
either to release from confinement or to recommit ment under procedures similar to those
used in civil commitments. For these reasons, the Supreme Court's decision in Jones v.
United States marks an unwarranted retreat from Supreme Court precedent giving strong
procedural protections to mentally ill offenders.
Becauselones marks a distinct departure from prior Supreme Court cases increasing
the procedural rights available to mentally ill offenders, predicting how the Court will
evaluate future cases in the mental health area is difficult. If the Court chooses to return
to the line of cases preceding Jones, the impact that this decision will have on future
commitment cases may not he significant. Indeed, since the Court's opinion is both
substantively and analytically flawed, it is to be hoped that Jones will remain a lone
aberration among cases involving commitment proceedings. In keeping with recent
statutory cutbacks in the insanity defense which followed in the wake of Hinckley's
insanity acquittal, however, Jones may be an early and alarming warning that the Court is
reversing its line of cases which uniformly had strengthened the procedural rights of
mentally ill offenders.
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